Will HIPC Matter? The Debt Game and Donor Behaviour in Africa by Birdsall, Nancy et al.
Copyright  Author(s) 2002
1  Center for Global Development (nbirdsall@cgdev.org); 2  Universiteit van Amsterdam
(stijn@fee.uva.nl), and 3 World Bank (idiwan@worldbank.org)
This is a revised version of the paper originally prepared for the UNU/WIDER development conference
on Debt Relief, Helsinki, 17-18 August 2001.
UNU/WIDER gratefully acknowledges the financial contribution from the governments of Denmark,
Finland and Norway to the 2000-2001 Research Programme.
Discussion Paper No. 2002/50
Will HIPC Matter? The Debt Game
and Donor Behaviour in Africa
Nancy Birdsall,1 Stijn Claessens 2
and Ishac Diwan 3
May 2002
Abstract
In this paper we focus on the question: will the HIPC debt reduction programme help in
the transformation of the development assistance business and change the rules of the
‘debt game’ in Africa? We concentrate on the donor and official creditor side, by
exploring how the growing debt of African countries, over the last two decades, has
affected the provision of new resources by the donor community. Our results indicate
that if debt levels are reduced sufficiently in high debt countries, donors can shift from
the current pattern of non-selectivity and defensive lending to a low debt regime, a
regime that has in the past allowed selectivity in lending in relation to levels of poverty
and quality of policy.
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1 Introduction
At the turn of the century, the international donor community has put a high priority on
a one-time reduction of the official debt of more than 40 of the world’s poorest
countries. The initiative, known as HIPC (for highly indebted poor countries), has been
supported, indeed pushed hard, by non-governmental groups, many working under the
banner of the aptly named Jubilee 2000 initiative of church-led groups. The objective of
Jubilee 2000 and other non-governmental groups as well as of the official bilateral and
multilateral donors is to significantly reduce the burden of debt service by poor
countries to the multilateral organizations and other official donors, allowing debt-laden
countries to devote more of their own resources to health, education and other
programmes to reduce poverty and improve people’s well-being.
The debt reduction initiative is one part of a larger effort by the international donor
community to redefine the external assistance strategy toward the poorest countries.1
This stems from a recognition that despite billions of dollars of assistance over more
than three decades, economic growth in these countries remains low and the reduction
of income-defined poverty (there has been progress, although uneven across countries,
in areas such as school enrolment and reductions in infant mortality) is painstakingly
slow and in some countries entirely stalled. Civil society groups have played a central
role in shaping the new strategy. The strategy is built on three axes: greater ownership
of reform programmes by recipient country governments and, through increased
participation of citizens and civil society groups in each country, by their societies;
greatly improved coordination of donors—an elusive objective up to now—by
governments that are truly ‘in the driver’s seat’; and a new round of reduction of the
onerous debt overhang of the poorest countries, this time including multilateral debt, i.e.
debt owed to the international financial institutions. Many civil society groups in the
donor countries have also emphasized the need for an increase in the total volume of
development assistance.
While the new approach seeks a historical break with past practices, it also relies on a
courageous leap of faith. Why would practices that are well entrenched in the countries
and in the IMF, the World Bank, the regional development banks, and among bilateral
donors, change quickly? Why would internal problems of recipient countries, including
lack of technical capacity and in some cases, governments that are not accountable to
their citizens, disappear? Will the ‘ownership’ approach adequately distinguish between
countries able to sustain the reforms necessary for growth, and those unable to do so?
Will the creditors and donors become more selective in their transfers and in the debt
reduction itself, concentrating adequately on the former group? In short, will the new
approach resolve the fundamental constraints of the past? Finally, if the problems of the
past are resolved, will the traditional donors increase net transfers sufficiently to finance
the critical social, physical and institutional investments that would in turn crowd in the
private resources ultimately needed?
A large literature has developed on the country factors that influence the development
aid business and the effectiveness of aid. Two major findings emerge: an adequate
policy and institutional environment in the recipient country is key to aid effectiveness;
                                                
1  The donor community has formally set the goal of reducing the number of people in the world living
in extreme poverty by half between 1990 and 2015 (IMF, OECD, UN and World Bank Group, 2000:
A Better World for All, June 2000, www.paris21.org/betterworld).2
but aid and debt relief have not been particularly targeted to countries with adequate
policies and institutions.2
In this paper we concentrate on understanding the dynamics behind the second finding,
i.e. behind the aid process from the donor and official creditor side. We do so by
exploring how the growing debt of African countries over the last two decades has
affected the process of granting new loans and grants to them by the donor community.
We look at the past to understand a question about the future: Will the HIPC debt
reduction programme help in the transformation of the development assistance
business? Or will debt reduction simply invite another round of business-as-usual (in the
form of new loans and new debt accumulation) of the kind that is implicated in the debt
build-up in the first place?3
Why should we focus on the effect of debt build-up on donor behaviour? We argue that
without this angle, the arguments of the proponents of debt reduction about the benefits
of HIPC are incomplete and need to be extended. Proponents have focused on the speed
and size of debt reduction. But there has been no analysis of past donor and creditor
behaviour to provide guidance on a framework for new debt relief that will benefit the
low-income countries. For one thing, official debt reduction via the HIPC programme
will not necessarily provide additional resources to countries, i.e., it will not necessarily
lead to higher transfers net of debt service payments. Additionality, either at the country
or aggregate level, is likely to be endogenous and an outcome of the process: we can
only expect more aid over time if aid is demonstrably more effective at reducing
poverty. The traditional argument about the potential positive effect of debt reduction—
that it would reduce uncertainty and fear of future high taxation, and thus might trigger
a new higher level of investment—was made in the context of expected changes in the
behaviour of private agents in the case of Latin America in the late 1980s (Sachs 1990;
Krugman 1990). For Africa, however, and indeed for most of the poorest countries with
high debt, most debt is official (owed to other governments or to multilateral
institutions), not commercial. For most countries in most years, net transfers have been
positive, i.e. there has been no ‘debt tax’ on recipients. Though reduction of public debt
might affect the expectations of the private sector in Africa, the main channel by which
debt reduction is likely to change the circumstances and development prospects in
Africa is through its effect on the behaviour of the official donors, and then in turn on
the behaviour of countries.
These considerations motivated us to investigate the possible sources of ‘efficiency
gains’ that would be connected with HIPC. We use past creditor and donor behaviour as
guides to what might happen going forward. Future gains related to debt reduction are
the flip side of what is likely to have been inefficient behaviour induced by the debt
crisis.
We begin with a description of what we call the ‘debt game’ in Africa over the last two
decades, including the basic information on net transfers by creditors and donors and the
accumulation of debt (section 2).  We then set out the logic for our analysis of how the
                                                
2 World Bank (1998).
3 Easterly (1999) develops a model to explain why countries with certain characteristics end up with
high debt. His model has the strong implication that countries pursue bad policies to receive future
debt reduction. The model does not examine the behavior of the creditors to these countries.3
ongoing HIPC programme (HIPC II) for reduction of multilateral debt could alter the
debt game. We outline its potential effects on additionality, i.e. an increase in total net
transfers by donors to the HIPC countries; on country ownership and efficiency in the
use of transfers by recipient countries to a particular country; and on donor selectivity,
i.e. on donor willingness and ability to discriminate among recipient countries in where
transfers are likely to be most effective in encouraging broad-based growth and poverty
reduction. We justify a focus in particular on selectivity (Section 3). In Section 4, we
turn to our empirical analysis of the selectivity of donor and creditor behaviour over the
last two decades. We conclude by summarizing the implications of our results for the
potential benefits of the HIPC debt reduction programme.
2 Development assistance and the debt game in Africa, the 1980s and 1990s
Over the last 25 years Sub-Saharan African countries have been major recipients of
overseas development assistance. Gross transfers in the form of grants and loans from
bilateral and multilateral donors have amounted to about US$ 350 billion (in nominal
terms—the figure in dollars of the year 2000 would be much higher). In some countries
in some years, gross transfers were as much as 60 per cent of GDP; in many countries
transfers often exceeded the government’s own revenue collection
In the same period, with a few exceptions, countries have had relatively low rates of per
capita growth. The growth rate per capita for the region as a whole was negative in the
1980s (about –2 per cent per year) and about –1 per cent in the 1990s. Despite high
levels of lending and grant programmes, average GDP per capita at constant prices is
lower in 2000 than it was in 1960, and the number and proportion of poor people have
increased; of its population of 600 million, 40 per cent in Sub-Saharan Africa today live
on less than US$ 1 a day.4
Meanwhile, the high levels of development assistance in the form of loans and low
growth have combined to produce a growing stock of debt—from about US$ 60 billion
in 1980 to US$ 230 billion in the year 2000. Annual debt service paid also increased,
but by much less, from an average of US$ 6 billion per annum in the early 1980s to
about US$  11 billion in the late 1990s. Indeed, donors and creditors, to help
governments avoid arrears on their high debt service obligations, and to maintain the
credibility and potential benefits of their favoured programmes, have resorted to a
combination of debt rescheduling and fresh loans and grants which, in fact, represent
fewer truly additional resources. The resulting process, if not a shell game,5 is hardly
one conducive to sustained development initiatives truly owned and managed by
recipient governments. The basic features of the debt game as it evolved over the last
two decades in Africa can be summarized as follows.6
                                                
4 World Bank (2000a). An estimated 200 million have no access to health services.
5 This is the term used by Sachs et al. (1999).
6 From now on, data we use throughout is for a subset of African countries, the dataset is described in
part 4 below.4
2.1 Large and positive net transfers, with no ‘debt tax’
Average net transfers as a proportion of GDP for Africa (in our sample) as a whole
have been about 12 per cent, representing half of all government revenue and most of
all public investment. Figures 1a, 1b and 1c show net official and private transfers, debt
service and disbursements for two subperiods: 1977-87 and 1988-98, in nominal terms.
Figure 1A
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Debt service paid by the countries rose somewhat in the 1990s, from 4.5 to 5 per cent of
GNP, compared to the 1980s as their total debt stock grew. But even in the 1990s debt
service has always been less than half of net transfers—accumulating debt has in itself
not reduced net transfers. As is clear from the figures, total net transfers did not change
much (in nominal terms) in the 1990s compared to the 1980s because new
disbursements were sufficient to maintain more or less steady total transfers net of debt
service. In the aggregate in short, there has been no ‘debt tax’, i.e. the average country
(in our sample, see below) have not been worse off in terms of net transfers as their debt
stock rose over time.
But have countries with higher debts been treated worse that those with little debt? To
provide a first cut answer, we have divided our sample into various subgroups of
potential interest—we call these the low and high debt regimes, and the low and high
multilateral debt regimes. Each cell (country/date) is considered low or high debt
regime depending on whether its related debt to GNP ratio is below or above 62.8 per
cent (the median of the sample). The high debt group has been further subdivided into a
low and a high multilateral debt group, depending on whether the share of multilateral
debt in total debt is below or above 41.2 per cent (again the median of the sample).
Figure 2 illustrates the size of the sub-samples: over time, both the share of high debt
cases grew, and so did the share of high multilateral debt cases within the high debt
group.
We can now compare the average behaviour of net transfers and debt service over the
different debt regimes (see Table 2). Somewhat surprisingly at first sight, while net
transfers are about constant over time (as a share of GNP), they are larger in high debt
and especially in the high multilateral debt regimes. Consistently, countries with high
debt ratios and high debts due to multinational institutions have received larger net6
transfers: 21 per cent of GNP in the 1980s, and 17.5 per cent in the 1990s. The low debt
regimes have received much less (10.5 and 8 per cent of GNP). Interestingly, the low
multilateral debt cases (a subdivision of the high debt regime) which received 15 per
cent of GNP in the 1980s received only net transfers of 6 per cent of GNP in the 1990s.
It is also interesting to note that debt service paid varied much less among the groups—
between 3.5 and 6.5 per cent of GNP. We are thus left with a first mystery. Rather than
a debt tax, there is some evidence of a debt subsidy: countries that found themselves
with higher debts, and especially to international organizations, have actually received
larger net transfers than other countries.
Figure 2
How has the pre-HIPC game worked? Four debt regimes









1977-82 1983-87 1988-92 1993-98
Legend: HD = high debt = debt/GNP > 0.6
HM = high multilateral debt = multilateral debt/total debt >0.4
2.2 No additionality since debt reduction: donors having apparently financed
debt service reductions from a given total envelope of development assistance
Over the last two decades, there have been repeated rounds of debt rescheduling and
reductions of debt service obligations by bilateral donors, as they have tried to deal with
the recipients’ lack of growth and consequent difficulty in meeting debt payments.7  In
the aggregate, it is clear that these reschedulings and reductions in debt service have not
represented additional transfers for the recipient countries, since in fact the real value of
total net transfers has declined.8 Our data on net transfers actually include some
information on debt and debt service reduction (the way these are included in ODA is
unfortunately not entirely consistent across countries, see Renard and Cassimon 2001
for a description of how donors account for debt reduction). On average, countries have
received on a yearly average basis less than 2 per cent of GNP in debt and debt service
reduction over the 1990s (zero over the 1980s). Excluding this debt and debt service
reduction from net transfers, ‘net’ net transfers have thus fallen even more. Moreover,
net transfers have fallen despite a slight increase in official disbursements, as debt
service owed to official creditors has risen. An increase in grants (from bilateral
                                                
7 The repeated rounds of debt reschedulings are described in Daseking and Powell (1999).
8 Given grants only, the real value increased slightly (Figure 1A)7
donors—who were switching from loans to grants throughout the two decades) kept net
transfers positive in absolute nominal terms, though not in real terms.9
2.3 Creditors’ increasing presence has meant reduced space for ‘ownership’
of development programmes by recipients
Behind high and relatively steady net transfers over more than two decades lay large
increases in gross transfers and debt service payments. Growing disbursements from
donors and creditors meant their involvement in the development programmes of
recipient countries was much larger (about one-third larger) in 1998 than at the
beginning of the 1980s. Meanwhile the debt service burden also grew, increasing (in
nominal terms) from US$ 6.3 billion to US$ 11.1 billion for this sample of Sub-Saharan
countries (Figure 1).
The largest component of aid to Africa has been grants from bilateral donors. Grants
have come primarily in the form of ‘projects’ as opposed to more fungible policy-based
budget support, or debt relief. Grants mostly finance discrete projects and include a
large dose of donor country technical assistance that is not fungible. What data there are
on project vs. non-project aid indicate that there has been no measurable increase (if
anything, a slight decline) between the 1980s and the 1990s in the share of donor
assistance to non-project budget support, and that the share of debt relief increased only
marginally (see appendix).
In the absence of budget support, it is the governments’ domestic budgets that have to
finance debt service. In 1998, gross donor disbursements (including grants) for projects
were about US$ 13 billion, and for general budget support about US$ 3 billion.10 Debt
service paid from the budget was about US$ 9 billion. Thus, including debt repayments
and excluding projects financed, governments on average in Africa had to finance a net
negative transfer from their budget of US$ 6 billion. Governments thus ended up ‘cash-
poor,’ but ‘project rich’. Of course, if all the projects financed were, in fact, high
priority for the governments, the bottom line is still a healthy positive net transfer, given
the fungibility of money. The problem arises if the projects in fact reflected donor
priorities more than government priorities—not only among investments but also
between investment and operating costs of existing investment projects. In fact, most
public investment in Sub-Saharan Africa has been externally financed.11 A shift from
investments to budget support would be more efficient assuming the marginal return to
                                                
9 The mean of the dependent variable in the regression analysis, which is of course not weighted by
population of the different countries and is not population-weighted within the countries, shows an
annual decline in net transfers by about 0.14 percentage points of GNP per year for the average
country. The decline accelerated in the second of the two periods, to 0.15 compared to 0.13 in the first
period. The figures in the appendix give an idea of the variability of net transfers over time within
countries. Sachs et al, 1999, discuss the difficulty for recipient countries of managing variability
particularly if it is unpredictable. It is difficult to assess real variability from these data, however,
since some of the variability may be associated with lumpiness in transfers at the beginning and end of
each year, i.e. with less unpredictability than the figures imply.
10 World Bank (2000b).
11 Reflecting the dominance of the donors in public investment projects, public investment is higher than
in other developing countries, given income. Public investment is also relatively high compared to the
central government budget (one-third and more) and to GDP (5 to 10 per cent) (World Bank 2000a).8
public investment is low (Devarajan 1996), as is likely to be the case in many countries
in Africa, given low growth despite positive investment rates.12
2.4 Growing portion of total debt owed to the multilateral creditors
Meanwhile, a growing proportion of recipients’ debt and debt payments became due to
the multilaterals. Figure 2 illustrates how between 1977 and 1998, more and more
countries in Africa shifted from a low  debt to a high  debt category (high debt
classification being for countries in any years when their debt/GNP ratio exceeded 62.8
per cent); and from what we label a low multilateral debt regime to a high multilateral
debt regime (when the share of multilateral debt out of total debt exceeded 41.2 per
cent).13
High multilateral debt became the norm as net transfers of bilateral creditors had
become negative by the second period, with bilateral donors switching to grants (Figure
1a). IMF net transfers also fell, and the World Bank switched from IBRD lending to the
more concessional IDA transfers, with a lower future debt component.14  Net transfers
from private creditors became negative in the second period, from a marginally positive
amount in the first period.
With the shift of bilaterals to grants, and the various debt forgiveness, rescheduling and
reduction programmes of the bilaterals, the share of multilateral creditors in the total
debt of recipient countries increased substantially. Between the early 1980s and the end
of the 1990s, the stock of multilateral debt increased from about one-seventh of total
debt (in 1980) to almost one-third in 1998. The share of the multilaterals in debt service
grew even faster from one-tenth (1980) to one-third, as debt service on multilaterals’
earlier round of concessional lending fell due.15 Debt service to private creditors rose
somewhat, but most of the total average annual increase from US$ 6 billion to US$ 11
billion for Sub-Saharan African countries was due to official creditors.
The result, of course, was that debt service payments of countries to multilaterals rose,
so that higher disbursements by the multilaterals or bilaterals against new programmes
and projects were needed to prevent a reduction in total net transfers to the recipient
countries. This became increasingly difficult because in some countries the
administrative capacity to absorb new money in new programmes and projects was
limited. In addition, without a minimum commitment to policy reform and the ability of
governments to sustain that commitment politically, the donors as a group, and in
particular the multilaterals, faced the difficulty of designing and enforcing the policy
conditions needed to justify new lending, particularly new programme lending. In
addition, the growing multilateral debt made it more difficult for the bilaterals to switch
                                                
12 In addition the system appears to be biased towards capital goods, with not enough finance going to
labor costs—indeed, the labour share collapses after the 1980s in most African countries (Diwan
1999).
13 In both cases these are the medians for the relevant samples.
14 Some countries that had been receiving IBRD loans became eligible for IDA loans as their per capita
income fell, and this affects our aggregate numbers that cover IDA and IBRD countries in Africa.
15 Total debt service paid was also increasing, of course, from about 7 to 15 per cent of the value of
exports.9
away from non-fungible projects to budget support, since they generally have preferred
to provide budget support only under the umbrella of IMF and World Bank-led
agreements with recipient governments on policy changes.
2.5 The overall result: a multilateral as well as a debt crisis
Over the two decades, differences emerged among countries in Africa in the relative
size of their overall debt and in the share of their debt owed to the multilaterals.
However, the fact is that over time more countries became ‘high debt’ countries and
more became in particular ‘high multilateral debt’ (HM) countries. Table 2 includes
several revealing facts about the HM countries as a group: (i) total net transfers as a per
cent of GNP were higher for HM countries than for the others, especially in the 1990s;
and (ii) for HM countries, though not for low debt countries, debt service payments
actually declined in the 1990s, as they apparently benefited more than the others from
the switch of bilateral donors to grants (and probably of IBRD to IDA lending, as some
of them suffered negative per capita income growth and became IDA-eligible).
Meanwhile the IMF and the World Bank were transferring a lower share of all net
transfers to the Africa region (perhaps because of the absorption problem noted above),
and were receiving an increasing share of all debt service payments.
The emerging picture then is one where the multilaterals appear to have been caught
along with the poor countries in a debt trap, victims of their own and the donor
community’s eagerness to avoid recipient countries’ falling behind in debt service to the
multilaterals (with its larger costs including loss of access to trade credits and future
lending). The donor community as a whole was trapped in a second sense as well, since
it relies on the multilaterals to manage the policy dialogue backed by large programme
transfers (with accompanying leverage on policy via loan conditions). On the other
hand, we cannot be sure of such a conclusion from Table 2 alone. It is possible that the
high transfers to the high debt and high multilateral debt countries were due to other
reasons, in particular to their higher level of poverty (evident in Table 2) or, given their
high poverty, to their relatively better policies compared to other recipient countries
(possible but less evident in Table 2). Below we turn to regression analysis to sort out
the relevance and weight of these factors.16
3 The HIPC programme and future donor behaviour
It was in this context—of rising debt stocks, despite repeated rounds of debt relief, and
growing multilateral debt with diminishing donor discretion—that the proposal for debt
reduction in the highly indebted poor countries (HIPCs) arose. 17 To motivate our
analysis, here we comment on the potential effect of the proposed debt reduction via the
HIPC programme on donors’ and creditors’ future behaviour in terms of three issues:
                                                
16 Of course, other factors such as deteriorating terms of trade may also have played a role in the
deteriorating debt situations of many low-income countries. Such factors alone nevertheless cannot
explain the willingness of donors to continue to lend in light of worsening debt situations.
17 There are many extant descriptions of the HIPC programme. See www.WorldBank.org/hipc/about
/about.html for a good analysis of the costs under different assumptions.10
additionality, increased scope for efficiency and ownership by recipient governments,
and selectivity.
3.1 Additionality
A first question about future donor behaviour is whether the HIPC programme will
constitute additional funds for development needs, or whether its costs will crowd out
new transfers by donors.18 (In the aggregate debt rescheduling and debt service
reductions in the past do not seem to have been associated with additional transfers, as
we note above.)19 A good portion of the reduction of multilateral debt under HIPC will
be financed by bilateral donors, including through their contributions to multilateral
trust funds which are set up to receive donations and then deploy them against the
multilaterals’ balance sheets. If these bilateral contributions come from the same
political reservoir for development assistance as potential future donations to the
multilaterals’ concessional windows, then they may simply end up as another way in
which bilaterals channel aid.
In short there is the risk of a tradeoff between debt reduction and new money. In
bilateral donor budgets, real increases would be needed in the future to finance both
new programmes and the annualized cost of the HIPC debt reduction.20 In the absence
of real increases in those budgets, aid disbursements could simply be replaced by debt
write-offs of an equivalent value. (In fact, for bilateral donors, debt write-offs cost less
than the nominal value of the debt forgiven to the extent there was some probability the
debt would not be fully repaid anyway.)21
For the multilateral institutions, whatever portion of debt reduction they finance
internally requires recourse to the use of capital or profits from ordinary lending.22 That
amount is divisive among the shareholders since use of capital or profits can raise the
                                                
18  Whether donors provide additional assistance following HIPC debt reductions is particularly
important because the size of the debt reduction programme itself is not that great in terms of recipient
countries’ needs. Martin (2000) notes that for all HIPC countries taken together, the annual savings on
debt servicing from HIPC II levels of relief are equivalent to only about a tenth of total net resource
flows to those countries. In referring to Martin, Killick (2000) makes the point that expectations of the
effect of HIPC on countries’ capacity to finance their own programmes of poverty reduction are thus
probably exaggerated.
19 Using our country and panel data, we estimated the effect of past debt service reductions on net
transfers by the bilaterals (in loans and grants) and multilaterals. We found evidence of only weak
additionality (less than one-to-one, and virtually none at all if the value of debt stock were
discounted).
20 Such increases could come from the contracting of assistance to middle-income countries (e.g. Israel,
the Balkans, as cold war motives and older historical links phase out) but there is no reason to count
on this.
21 Moreover, contributions of bilaterals to trust funds can be divisive and create burden sharing
difficulties, as different donors want to support different countries in different regions. For example,
the French are likely to be concerned to target any contributions from them for multilateral debt
reduction to the Francophone African countries.
22 This is the case for the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the Asian
Development Bank. The African Development Bank does not have sufficient hard loan assets to resort
to this device, and thus requires bilateral contributions to trust funds to cover reduction of its debt.11
cost of borrowing to middle-income borrowers. For that reason, use of net profits for
HIPC is likely to cut into the future allocations of those same profits to the concessional
funds for new loans (in effect diverting resources from non-HIPC IDA-eligible
countries).
Finally, the size of the enhanced HIPC II Initiative (though small in terms of recipient
country needs)23 increases the likelihood that debt reduction will substitute for new
transfers. While the original HIPC Initiative, initiated in the fall of 1996, sought to bring
down the ratios of debts to exports to 250 per cent, the expanded initiative seeks to
bring them down further, to 150 per cent (in net present value terms).24
In short, there is no reason to expect the envelope of donor resources to increase
because of debt relief; additionality in future transfers may have to come only for some
countries, at the cost of others, through greater discrimination or selection among
potential recipient countries by donors.
3.2 Efficiency and ownership
Even in the absence of additionality at the recipient country level, countries could
benefit from the HIPC programme if it leads to allocation of a higher portion of total net
transfers for budget support as opposed to specific projects, and if in the context of the
HIPC programme, it becomes easier for countries to manage donor resources and thus
‘own’ their own programmes. (This is the philosophy behind the new requirement that
recipient countries prepare their own ‘poverty reduction strategy papers’ to provide the
basis for the HIPC debt relief and for subsequent new lending.)25
The problem is that in the past donors and creditors may have been reluctant to increase
budget support because they lacked confidence in the capacity and accountability of
recipient governments.26 In this context, debt reduction has the disadvantage that it
releases the creditworthiness constraint, allowing impatient (or badly managed or
corrupt) governments to accumulate debt again (Easterly 1999)—unless donors exercise
limits on new lending of a kind that they did not exercise in the past (see on this also the
debt sustainability exercises for the HIPC programme).  Thus whether debt reduction
increases ownership and efficiency in use of future net transfers boils down to the
question of donor and creditor behaviour: whether debt reduction, once accomplished,
will make donors and creditors more able or willing to be selective in channelling
                                                
23 See footnote 17.
24 The expanded initiative would reduce the debts of some 40 countries by an estimated US$ 27 billion
(in net present value terms), of which half would be borne directly by multilateral organizations and
the other half by official and private creditors. See Table 1 for a list of the possible eligible countries.
25 Whether this will occur in practice, given political and time constraints, is not yet clear.
26 It would be useful to test explicitly whether donors have switched over time to more budget or
programme support. The problem is lack of adequate data to distinguish between ‘project’ and budget
support. And even with good data, it would still be difficult to distinguish between project support that
is fungible from the point of view of receiving governments and project support that is not. In any
event, as we note, this benefit can only be realized if donors are able to enforce ‘good’ policies after
debt reduction. So the benefits of efficiency are contingent on the question of whether debt reduction
would allow for more selectivity.12
resources to countries with governments that are reasonably accountable in terms of
good policies and financial management.
3.3 The bottom line is thus selectivity
In short, we believe a sensible case can be made that the potential additionality and
ownership effects of the HIPC programme of debt reduction rely heavily on whether the
programme will enable donors to be more selective across countries in their future post-
HIPC transfers. Country selectivity would imply that after debt reduction, donors and
creditors would be better able to channel limited resources to those recipient countries
more capable, in terms of their policy stance and their institutions, of using transfers
well, and more likely to benefit from transfers because of their lower initial levels of
income per capita and higher levels of poverty.27
Where governments are not able or willing to spend incoming resources to promote
development and reduce poverty, donors need not abandon countries altogether. They
can still maintain a policy dialogue if governments are receptive, and to improve the
well-being of the poor in the short run they can finance small food, health, and
education programmes administered by non-government groups, and can support
strengthening institutions of civil society. Such assistance would best come in the form
of much smaller amounts directed to non-government entities; and is unlikely to affect
much if at all the trends and relations we analyse below.
4 Creditor and donor selectivity: an empirical analysis
We investigate the question of selectivity by assessing the extent to which in the past
donors and creditors provided higher net transfers to countries with better policies, and
adjusted their transfers with changes in recipient country policies; and by assessing
whether for given a policy framework, countries with higher levels of poverty received
higher net transfers. In doing so, we also look at the extent of defensive or forced
lending (i.e., lending by creditors associated with debt stock or debt service due to
them) and at how donors and creditors implicitly shared the transfer burden and relied
(or not) on leverage and conditionality. In short, has there been selectivity by donors
and creditors as a function of countries’ changing policies and degree of poverty? Or
has the mounting debt stock and the resulting debt ‘crisis’ locked donors into some form
of defensive lending to high debt countries, depriving them of selectivity and sufficient
leverage with respect to recipient country policies?
4.1 Data and estimation
To assess creditor and donor behaviour, we use information on debt indicators and net
donor and creditor transfers for a sample of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa over the
period 1977 to 1998. We want to assess donor behaviour to countries in the region
independent of whether they eventually became HIPC-eligible or not, bearing in mind
                                                
27 Collier and Dollar (1999) show that aggregate donor transfers could be more effective in increasing
growth and reducing poverty were they channeled to countries with higher poverty rates.13
that those that did become HIPC-eligible were those where donor transfers are likely to
have at least appeared more defensive. We therefore use a sample that includes both
HIPC and non-HIPC countries. This avoids any sample selection problem. We include
in our analysis all Sub-Saharan countries for which we have the necessary data. Of
the 46 countries in Africa included in the figures above we end up with a sample of 35
countries—countries including Ethiopia, Eritrea, Angola, Guinea, Somalia and Tanzania
are excluded for lack of data on many individual years. Of the 46 countries, 32 are








































For our 35 countries, we have a total of 666 country/year observations, with 284
observations in the first period and 382 in the second.28 All data on debt, net transfers
and interest forgiven are from the World Bank’s Global Development Finance statistics.
This dataset, published annually by the World Bank, relies on creditors ‘reports for the
debt statistics and on donors’ ODA and OECD reports for the grant information. Grants
tend to include debt and debt service reduction, but the quality of this data is known to
be poor (see further Renard and Cassimon 2001). Data on GNP per capita are from the
IMF International Financial Statistics. We also use a measure of poverty from Collier
and Dollar (1999).
Our analysis is based on the results of estimations of the following form:
(1) Net transfers ij = f (debt ij, policy i, policy i
2, poverty i, poverty i
2, population size i,
debt reduction i )
in which net transfers and debt variables are scaled to GNP; ‘debt’ refers to a measure
                                                
28 We limit the impact of outliers by dropping observations for years when net transfers to a country as a
share of GNP is more than 30 per cent.Table 2
Means and standard deviations (a
All Low debt High debt Low multilateral High multilateral
Mean St dev. Mean St dev. Mean St dev. Mean St dev. Mean St dev.
Period 1977-98
Total net transfers/GNP 0.12 0.1 0.1 0.07 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.19 0.11
Total debt services/GNP 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.05
Total debt stock/GNP 0.73 0.56 0.33 0.16 1.13 0.55 1.15 0.48 1.11 0.61
Total debt services reduction/GNP 0.01 0.01 0 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02
Total debt stock reduction/GNP 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.01 0 0.02 0 0.01
CPIA (policy index) 2.84 0.73 2.96 0.79 2.74 0.66 2.49 0.66 2.98 0.57
GDP per capita 748.18 1100.07 1014 1344.05 519.86 767.12 730.23 1051.04 318.44 118.78
Number of observations (b 753 379 374 186 188
Period 1977-87
Total net transfers/GNP 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.17 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.22 0.14
Total debt services/GNP 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.04
Total debt stock/GNP 0.49 0.36 0.29 0.14 0.90 0.35 0.91 0.33 0.88 0.42
CPIA (policy index) 2.83 0.74 2.82 0.79 2.84 0.65 2.74 0.58 3.12 0.77
GDP per capita 644.73 831.33 753.75 980.24 459.78 427.95 526.50 482.07 277.41 70.02
Number of observations 371 253 118 88 30
Period 1988-98
Total net transfers/GNP 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.14 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.18 0.11
Total debt services/GNP 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.05
Total debt stock/GNP 0.96 0.62 0.41 0.16 1.23 0.59 1.36 0.49 1.15 0.63
Total debt services reduction/GNP 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
Total debt stock reduction/GNP 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01
CPIA (policy index) 2.85 0.72 3.16 0.75 2.69 0.66 2.28 0.65 2.95 0.52
GDP per capita 829.96 1268.15 1406.6 1685.57 546.14 874.61 900.69 1334.18 326.23 124.57
Number of observations 382 126 256 98 158
Note: (a All reported variables are calculated as three-year moving averages.
(b The number of observations varies from the numbers in regressions, because in the latter the statistical programme drops any observation for which there are
missing values on any variable.
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such as total debt stock/GNP, or annual debt service/GNP; i refers to the recipient
country, and j refers to the creditor or donor—the multilaterals (the IMF, World Bank
distinguishing between IBRD and IDA (highly concessional) loans, and the African
Development Bank), the bilateral creditors, grants primarily from bilateral donors, and
private creditors. Net transfers are net of debt reduction. Our measure of debt reduction
is principal forgiven and interest forgiven (available only in the 1990s). We use three-
year moving averages of both the dependent and right-hand side variables. We estimate
this equation for all donors and creditors combined, and separately for each. Thus we
are able to look at the effects of ‘own’ debt stock owed to each creditor on total and
‘own’ transfers. We use ordinary least squares with and without fixed effects.
For our measure of the policy environment we use the World Bank’s Country Policy
and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), averaged over three years—the year for which we
are measuring net transfers and the previous two years. This measure, set annually by
World Bank country specialists, has 20 different components measuring
macroeconomic, sectoral, social and public sector institutions and policies on a scale of
1 to 6. It is set on the basis of criteria that are standardized across countries, and is used
to allocate scarce concessional (IDA) resources across countries from year to year. A
separate World Bank unit makes a considerable effort to ensure consistency and
comparability across countries and over time. Obviously the ratings have an element of
judgement that may be affected by specialists’ separate knowledge of a country’s actual
or likely overall prospects; this makes them potentially endogenous to, for example,
growth, though probably less to net transfers and disbursements in a particular year. It is
also possible that World Bank staff’s assessments are influenced indirectly by their
knowledge of or interests in the volume of lending itself, with some possibility that
lending then influences the CPIA. To the extent this is true, the link between policy and
lending will be overstated; and any result showing that policy is not a factor will thus be
a strong result.
The CPIA has the advantage of including not only criteria related to public policy effort
but criteria related to institutional capacity and thus may well be more closely related to
capacity to absorb transfers effectively than traditional measures of policy effort such as
trade liberalization, privatization, and so on.29 Collier and Dollar (1999) show that
transfers (to all recipient countries) are nonmonotonic with respect to the CPIA; they
rise between low and moderate CPIAs and then decline as CPIAs improve further. We
therefore allow for this nonlinearity.
Figure 3 shows the average CPIA across the 35 countries in our sample for the years
1977 through 1997.30 On average, policies appear to have improved somewhat, with the
variance across countries declining slightly. (Both changes may reflect a tendency for
Bank country staff to have become slightly more optimistic over time in their
assessments, and for Bank central staff to have converged with their ratings, perhaps as
an outcome of constant negotiations with country staff.)
                                                
29 In the absence of any good argument for alternative weighting of the components, we use the average.
Collier and Dollar (1999) show that their results regarding aid allocation and poverty are not sensitive
to reweighting the components.
30 This calculation excludes Sudan and Seychelles because of missing data on the poverty headcount.16
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For our measure of poverty, we use GDP per capita; for the 33 of our 35 countries for
which data are available, the correlation of GDP per capita and the poverty headcount in
the late 1990s (reliable data on poverty headcount are not available for earlier years) is
–0.62. The GDP per capita measure has an additional benefit; donors may view
recipient countries that are poorer on average as more needy of transfers than countries
that have high levels of poverty but because of income concentration also have higher
average GDP per capita. (This is among other things the logic used for deciding whether
a country is eligible for the concessional window, IDA, of the World Bank.) Following
Collier and Dollar, we also allow for the possibility that transfers by donors take into
account the likelihood of diminishing returns to poverty reduction by including GDP per
capita squared. We control for population size because of the tendency of small
countries to receive higher transfers per capita, probably because of high fixed
programme costs. Table 2 shows means and standard deviations for all the variables.
4.2 Results: selectivity or forced lending?
Selectivity across countries on the part of donors and creditors would be reflected in
higher net transfers to countries with better ‘policy’ (a higher CPIA) or greater poverty
(lower GDP per capita), independent of ‘own’ debt stock/debt service or total debt
stock/debt service. Selectivity on policy is a necessary condition for any leverage on the
part of donors or creditors, whether via traditional conditionality or via higher lending
without formal conditionality to countries which have better policy and institutional
environments. 31
Estimating equation 1 (see Table 3) over the whole sample suggests that there is a
strong positive relation between net transfers and debt stocks. Other experiments using
an interactive dummy for high debt regimes indicated that the type of debt regime also
affects the coefficients of the regressions. We therefore also estimated equation 1
separately for low and high debt countries, and for low and high multilateral debt
                                                
31 This form of selectivity would require showing that transfers contributed to better policy; there is not
any good evidence that this has been the case. See, for example, Killick (1996) and the earlier
Reviews of Adjustment Lending of the World Bank, and the report Adjustment in Africa (World Bank
1994).17
countries. We also estimate the regressions for the entire period and the two separate
periods defined above. (F-tests verify that these categories are structurally different in a
statistical sense.) Table 3 shows the results from the regressions (without fixed effects;
we will refer to the fixed effects results in the text where they differ).32 We highlight
three broad points here before going over the detailed results.
First, net transfers, controlling for per capita GDP, population, debt stocks, and debt
service paid, have been higher for high debt and especially for high multilateral debt
countries (see the size of the constant terms), consistent with the aggregate data
presented above. In addition, net transfers are more dependent on policy variables in the
low debt regimes: in the high debt regimes by contrast, a larger share of the net transfers
is simply explained by a constant. It is as if the international community as whole
became less selective in the high debt regimes.
Second, the results confirm the emergence of the multilateral debt crisis suggested
above. In the regression over the whole sample, the policy variables (quality of policy
and low levels of income per capita) have the appropriate positive effect on total net
transfers (with the diminishing returns reported elsewhere). However, for the high
multilateral debt group, the results indicate that net transfers were much less ‘penalized’
by high income per capita in the second period compared to the first33 (the relevant
coefficient is three times smaller in the second period). The loss of selectivity with
respect to the quality of policy is even more pronounced. In the first period, better
policy is clearly associated with higher transfers. In the second period, however, that is
true only for the low multilateral debt countries. In the high multilateral debt countries,
the policy variable has a negative (and statistically significant) effect on net transfers—
as if the multilaterals were actually financing bad policies. For high multilateral debt
countries, in short, policy selectivity collapses (since the CPIA is partially connected to
the size of fiscal deficit, what is happening in parts is that deficits are getting financed
by donor).
The selectivity effects, while varying greatly across regimes, are not just statistically
significant but economically significant in most regimes, especially in the first period.
In the aggregate regression, an increase in the CPIA by one standard deviation above
the mean implies an increase in net transfers for the group from the mean of 12.2 per
cent of GDP to 13.2 per cent.34 A reduction of per capita GDP of one standard deviation
reduces net transfers for the group to 6.9 per cent. The big difference across regimes in
net transfers (e.g., in the second period 6 per cent for low multilateral debt countries
versus 18 per cent for high multilateral debt countries [see Table 2]) are thus
comparable in magnitude to difference in their policies or institutional capabilities
within regimes.
                                                
32 These results are available from the authors.
33 (with the effect changing the ratio of net transfers to GDP by as much as 5 to 10 percentage points,
equivalent to a doubling of total net transfers)
34 But an increase in the CPIA by one standard deviation above actually implies a larger increase in net
transfers for countries that had initially low CPIA because of the diminishing ‘returns’ to better policy
captured by the quadratic term.Table 3
Total net transfers/GDP regressions (a
All Low debt High debt Low multilateral High multilateral
Estimate T stat Estimate T stat Estimate T stat Estimate T stat Estimate T stat
Period 1977-98
Intercept 0.707 14.087 0.369 8.915 0.975 11.523 1.102 9.222 1.218 9.227
Total debt services/GNP -0.683 -8.975 -1.296 -11.371 -0.420 -3.873 -0.876 -5.186 -0.189 -1.410
Total debt stock/GNP 0.078 13.269 0.140 7.391 0.054 6.497 0.026 1.838 0.076 7.712
Total debt services reduction/GNP -0.078 -0.428 0.602 2.305 -0.311 -1.391 -0.353 -0.922 -0.138 -0.475
Total debt stock reduction/GNP -0.220 -0.881 -2.658 -2.452 -0.150 -0.526 -0.207 -0.610 -0.223 -0.480
CPIA (policy index) 0.071 3.555 0.028 1.893 0.127 3.331 0.155 3.375 -0.081 -1.158
CPIA^2 -0.010 -2.855 -0.003 -1.122 -0.023 -3.166 -0.025 -2.790 0.010 0.852
GDP per capita 0.000 -12.189 0.000 -9.085 0.000 -8.838 0.000 -4.816 -0.001 -4.101
GDP per capita^2 0.000 7.398 0.000 5.866 0.000 6.456 0.000 2.793 0.000 2.723
Log of population -0.043 -19.131 -0.020 -9.611 -0.060 -17.855 -0.069 -13.719 -0.050 -9.693
Number of observations 666 299 367 179 188
R^2 0.592 0.649 0.638 0.666 0.648
Period 1977-87
Intercept 0.668 9.745 0.389 8.219 0.977 6.773 1.218 4.684 1.185 4.209
Total debt services/GNP -1.214 -8.224 -1.304 -8.788 -1.290 -4.562 -1.163 -3.105 -0.985 -1.915
Total debt stock/GNP 0.157 10.767 0.145 5.533 0.100 3.918 0.079 2.231 0.091 2.351
Total debt services reduction/GNP No debt service reduction
Total debt stock reduction/GNP No debt stock reduction
CPIA (policy index) 0.075 2.732 0.052 3.128 0.264 3.340 0.216 1.684 0.355 2.960
CPIA^2 -0.012 -2.514 -0.007 -2.195 -0.044 -3.182 -0.034 -1.475 -0.061 -2.860
GDP per capita 0.000 -5.806 0.000 -7.074 0.000 -3.529 0.000 -3.415 -0.003 -1.664
GDP per capita^2 0.000 3.826 0.000 5.434 0.000 3.516 0.000 3.359 0.000 1.601
Log of population -0.041 -12.508 -0.023 -9.766 -0.071 -11.825 -0.080 -8.310 -0.075 -6.324
Number of observations 284 173 111 81 30




Total net transfers/GDP regressions (a
All Low debt High debt Low multilateral High multilateral
Estimate T stat Estimate T stat Estimate T stat Estimate T stat Estimate T stat
Period 1988-98
Intercept 0.618 8.558 0.305 3.916 0.852 8.493 0.586 4.764 1.403 8.898
Total debt services/GNP -0.671 -7.030 -1.708 -8.859 -0.374 -3.226 -0.971 -6.032 -0.066 -0.508
Total debt stock/GNP 0.074 10.654 0.169 5.443 0.063 7.363 0.034 2.554 0.088 9.021
Total debt services reduction/GNP 0.188 0.983 0.762 2.760 0.036 0.165 0.316 1.111 -0.078 -0.293
Total debt stock reduction/GNP -0.279 -1.121 -3.251 -2.788 -0.288 -1.079 -0.081 -0.304 -0.410 -0.968
CPIA (policy index) 0.058 2.110 -0.015 -0.467 0.066 1.452 0.226 4.122 -0.324 -3.913
CPIA^2 -0.005 -1.094 0.005 1.014 -0.009 -1.038 -0.043 -3.543 0.055 3.773
GDP per capita 0.000 -10.331 0.000 -5.552 0.000 -9.114 0.000 -4.610 -0.001 -5.633
GDP per capita^2 0.000 6.775 0.000 4.204 0.000 7.322 0.000 3.047 0.000 4.295
Log of population -0.038 -12.154 -0.013 -3.105 -0.050 -12.731 0.044 -7.779 -0.040 -6.919
Number of observations 382 126 256 98 158
R^2 0.608 0.716 0.641 0.646 0.688
F-tests for structural significance (a Without country dummies With country dummies
All 1977-87 1988-98 All 1977-87 1988-98
Low vs. high debt (F value) 6.399 11.547 1.506 4.582 0.379 0.632
Low vs high debt (prob. > F value) 0.012 0.001 0.221 0.033 0.539 0.427
Low multilateral vs. high multilateral debt (F value) 7.965 0.43 29.427 4.623 0.279 0.01
Low multilateral vs high multilateral debt
(prob. > F value)
0.005 0.513 0.000 0.032 0.599 0.92
Note: (a All reported variables are calculated as three-year moving averages.
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The results also indicate that the loss of selectivity is connected with a sharp rise in
defensive lending. In the first period, and in the second period for low debt and low
multilateral debt countries, an increase in total debt service paid tends to be more than
offset by a reduction in net transfers. There is no evidence of forced lending—quite the
opposite, creditors tend to withdraw from countries with higher debt service. This near-
neutrality, however, collapses in the second period for countries in the high multilateral
debt regime where the coefficient drops to zero. In this case, any increase in debt
service is being offset by an equivalent increase in disbursements, so that the net effect
on transfers is zero. All debt service payments are being refinanced in countries in the
high multilateral debt regime.35
Can we tell a more differentiated account by looking at the behaviour of the different
donors? Table 4 summarizes results with respect to the policy (CPIA) variable, based on
estimating equation 1 separately for each creditor and donor. (The results shown for
total net transfers in the top row are thus identical to those shown in Table 3.) Focussing
on the second period, the results for the entire sample (column 1) indicate that in general
the donors (especially the IMF and IDA) were selective with respect to recipient
country policy. However, in the high multilateral debt countries (column 5), the results
indicate that with the possible exception of IDA (significance level of 10 per cent), none
of the creditors or donors exercised policy selectivity. Transfers of the bilaterals through
loans and grants to these high multilateral debt countries were negatively related to the
policy index; i.e. within the high multilateral debt group bilateral, transfers were highest
where policies were worst. This is consistent with the possibility that the bilateral
donors were providing grant funds to the recipient countries with high multilateral debt
to ensure they would not go into arrears to the multilaterals.
In the fixed effects regression, where we are controlling for country-specific factors, the
effect of the policy variable is also positive in the entire sample, but smaller and
statistically significant only in the first period. A positive effect (but not significant) in
the first period for the high multilateral debt countries disappears in the second period—
consistent with a conclusion of a collapse of selectivity in these countries. The only
significant effect is for the low debt group in the second period. (In general our fixed
effects results are less robust, though in the same direction. We believe this reflects the
greater variation across countries than over time within countries. The CPIA and
poverty variables, for example, vary more across countries than over time.)
Table 5 summarizes the results from the same set of regressions as those used to
construct Table 4 in this case looking at the coefficients that capture the effect of own
debt services on own  net transfers for the creditors.  We are here interested in the
question of ‘forced’ lending by creditors, especially to countries that are in the high
multilateral debt regime, given the evidence that policy selectivity is less likely in these
countries. We use the term ‘forced’ lending rather than defensive lending because it
allows for one or both of two possibilities: defensive lending in the traditional sense—
that the creditor is anxious to retain some integrity of its own balance sheet; and lending
                                                
35 We also measure the impact of debt stocks on net transfers, given the size of debt service. The effect
is positive: a country with a large debt stock relative to its debt service must have debt with a longer
maturity and could be more ‘creditworthy’. This effect becomes smaller over time in the high debt
group and over debt regimes. However, this reduction is small relative to the (average) growth of debt
stocks, so that the overall effect of debt stocks on net transfers seems relatively constant across the
regressions.Table 4
CPIA effects for 1977-98
CPIA CPIA square















































































































































































































































































































Note: The second numbers are T statistics.
2
1Table 5
Own effect table (NT/GNP)
Debt service Debt stock






















































































































































































































































Poverty and population, 1977-98
Poverty Population
All Low debt High debt Low multi High multi All Low debt High debt Low mult High multi

















































































































































































































































































































that is meant to sustain net transfers for ‘development’ reasons despite debt service due
(independent of the balance sheet) including to avoid having one creditor be financed
indirectly by other creditors.
We interpret the coefficients as follows. Coefficients below –1 indicate a creditor is
withdrawing from a debtor, i.e., the effect of debt service due to it is to reduce net
transfers more than proportionately. A coefficient of about –1 implies independence
from the point of the view of the creditor between debt service due and net transfers;
there is no effort to refinance the former by increasing disbursements. A coefficient
close to 0 reflects the possibility of forced lending—creditors are ensuring repayment to
themselves by maintaining new lending at a level sufficient to finance the service due
them.
The results by creditor in Table 5 (the first column) indicate that private creditors and
the IMF are closest to forced lending, particularly in the case of the IMF for the high
multilateral debt countries, and particularly in the second period.36 Controlling for other
factors, transfers of IDA and the bilaterals are much more negatively related to debt
service (suggesting withdrawal). These results on own debt service are consistent with
the selectivity evidence above.
Our results are, thus, consistent with some ability of donors and creditors to be
selective—but less so in the case of recipient countries already with high debt, and
particularly with high multilateral debt. They are also consistent with forced lending,
whether for traditional defensive reasons or not, particularly on the part of the IMF, and
particularly in the second period when debt service due had risen as a per cent of GNP
in the countries then classified as high debt and high multilateral debt countries.
It is also interesting to explore the ways in which different donors change their
behaviour in targeting poorer countries. The results in Table 3 indicate donors across the
board have generally provided larger net transfers to countries that are poorer,
controlling for debt and policy variables. Results in the fixed effects estimation are
similar for the sample as a whole, with the exception of the high multilateral debt
countries, where the level of poverty is not statistically significant. Once again there is
evidence that there is less selectivity in this group. Table 6 is analogous to Tables 4
and 5; it shows the coefficients on the poverty variable (GDP per capita), based on
results of estimating equation 1 separately for each donor and creditor (without fixed
effects). For all countries, most donors and creditors have the expected negative (and
statistically significant) signs. The exceptions are the private sector for which net
transfers are, not surprisingly, positively (negatively) related to GDP per capita
(poverty) level, and the IMF, for which the coefficient is not statistically significant.
The IMF effect is driven by positive (negative) relation to GDP per capita (poverty) in
the high debt countries. These effects are stronger in the second period, when the IMF
like the private sector, lends more in less poor countries—with the interesting exception
                                                
36 Regressions (not shown) of annual disbursements show similarly that IMF disbursements are closely
linked to debt service due to the IMF, particularly in the second period, when the coefficients are near
and above 1, and particularly in high debt and high multilateral debt countries. This is also the case in
the fixed-effects estimations.25
of the high multilateral debt countries where, as noted above, there is probably an
element of forced lending.37
4.3 Results: has there been additionality?
One possibility is that countries with high debts have received large debt reductions (in
the form of debt service relief or reduction of their stock of debt), which would explain
why they are getting high net transfers since debt service reductions are generally
counted in the net transfers data. This would hold if there were no countervailing
movements in disbursements (i.e., all debt reduction was additional). But on the other
hand, countries that receive large debt reductions may be receiving lower
disbursements, especially if both disbursements and debt reductions come from an
essentially flat overall donor budget. Our data cover the debt reduction period of the
1990s, where bilateral donors forgave US$ 30 billion of debt service and loans in our
sample and offers a natural experiment for the extent to which debt reduction has been
additional in the past. The problem, however, is that the data on debt and debt service
reduction are poor—it is less well reported than the other flows, and the accounting
methods used by the various donors differ. We add to the right-hand variables estimates
of debt service and debt stock reductions. Since those are already counted in net
transfers, we would expect a coefficient of one under full additionality, zero indicating
no additionality at all. With the exception of the low debt case, the coefficients are close
to zero but not significant. This is consistent with the likelihood that in high debt
countries, donors have taken advantage of debt reduction to reduce disbursements
(including probably reversing previous forced lending) by about a one to one ratio. In
low debt countries, the effect is much smaller: for each dollar of debt service reduction,
disbursements have fallen by only 30 cents. We hesitate to be conclusive on this issue
because of the poor quality of the data. But our preliminary results seem to indicate that
the debt reduction of the 1990s crowded out other forms of disbursements and did not
constitute an ‘additional’ source of funds to the poor countries.38
4.4 Interpreting the results
Net transfers have remained positive over two decades in most countries of Sub-Saharan
Africa, and have only fallen slightly in the 1990s compared to the 1980s. Official
donors and creditors remained committed to development programmes in Sub-Saharan
Africa throughout the entire period. With low growth in recipient countries, however,
                                                
37 We also estimated equation 1 for the 31 countries for which we could use information on the poverty
headcount ratio for 1995 (not shown). In that regression the poverty variable was not statistically
significant. We conclude that the poverty result based on GDP per capita is not very robust; indeed it
may simply reflect the fact that with declining GDP any stickiness in net transfers (associated with
disbursements against multi-year projects for example) will lead to increased transfers as a ratio of
GDP wherever GDP per capita is falling. Donor selectivity with respect to poverty levels requires
additional study and better data.
38 We conducted several other experiments to test the robustness of the results. In particular, we tested if
outliers drove the results by progressively dropping outliers from the sample and re-running the same
regressions. The results are essentially the same. We also tried to run the regressions over shorter time
periods, to test whether there has been some improvements inselectivity in recent years, as sometimes
claimed. These results are however inconclusive: there is no evidence in our sample of recent
improvements, with the possible exception of IDA noted in the text.26
and continued net transfers, the stock of debt rose. The donors and creditors tried to
minimize the problem by shifting to grants in the case of the bilateral donors, and to the
more concessional IDA rather than IBRD lending in the case of the World Bank.
The data on net transfers are thus consistent with continued donor efforts to foster
development in Africa. At the same time, they are also consistent with an element of
‘forced’ lending. Controlling for levels of GDP per capita and population, the donor
community as a whole transferred more to high debt and particularly to high multilateral
debt countries, independent of—or even perversely related to—the countries’ policy
stance or institutional capacity. Donors as a group seemed driven by the need to avoid
recipient countries going into arrears to the multilaterals.
There were differences across donors. In the case of IDA, selectivity across countries
improved in the 1990s compared to the 1980s.39 However, bilateral grants and loans to
countries with high multilateral debt (to the IMF, World Bank and the African
Development Bank) appear to have become negatively selective, offsetting the positive
selectivity of IDA. In the case of the IMF, disbursements to high multilateral debt
countries in the second period were tied to debt service due to the IMF in a virtually
one-to-one relationship.
The behaviour of the donor community is not hard to explain. As the multilateral debt
stock and debt service burden grew, donors were anxious to help countries avoid
arrears, particularly to the multilaterals because of their preferred creditor status.
Arrears would be embarrassing given the high level of poverty in Africa; the
environment of constant search for new funds, particularly in the second period with the
greater emphasis on coordination under the Special Programme for Africa; and the new
rounds of lobbying in donor country legislatures for new IDA replenishments. For the
countries, arrears to the multilaterals would imply the loss of access to short-term trade
credits and thus of export income (which in turn was generating resources for debt
service) and loss of access to new grants and lending for new development programmes.
In addition, a constant stream of donor decisions on many new discrete programmes and
projects had its own self-fulfilling dynamic. It allowed a relatively optimistic view
about the likelihood of the next in-country reform being right around the corner, and
about the reasonableness of supporting official colleagues in each country that was
struggling to institute change and build institutions while managing increasing debt
service falling due.
Bilateral donors were able as a group to minimize their own responsibility for debt
build-up by switching to grant programmes and by reducing somewhat gross transfers.
Lacking clear signals from the multilaterals, their disbursement pattern across countries
became less refined—in our regressions, better explained by a constant than by
variables such as the quality of policy, or income per capita. The total net transfers of all
donors and creditors did gradually decline under the increasing weight of high debt
service, but not, ironically, to the high multilateral debt countries. For those countries,
new loans and grants (whether with ‘healthy’ conditionality or not, whether with
country ownership or not) were no longer (if they ever had been) vehicles for a dialogue
about policy or institution building; they were no longer effective as carrots or sticks.
By the end of the 1990s, the donor community had no real leverage on governance and
                                                
39 In the 1990s, IDA allocations became ‘performance-based’, i.e., tied specifically to the CPIA measure
we use in our regressions.27
economic and social policy in the high multilateral debt countries. The community was
stuck in a dance of new rounds of transfers to finance debt service, avoid embarrassing
arrears, and stave off growing risks of documented development failures.
5 Implications for the development benefits of more comprehensive debt
reduction
Our results indicate that if the debt level is reduced enough in high multilateral debt
countries, then donors can shift into a low debt regime in those countries—a regime that
in the past has allowed selectivity. Debt service reduction under HIPC (and now HIPC
II) thus appears to be a way ‘out’ for the donor community locked into a pattern of non-
selectivity in the high multilateral debt countries, fulfilling what is a necessary condition
for selectivity in the high multilateral debt countries.
Expectations are high that the HIPC programme of debt relief will free resources in high
debt countries for spending on the poor. But the programme, though small in relation to
the countries’ needs, is large enough in terms of traditional levels of donor financing
that it will eat into future donor allocations, and therefore may not be followed by
adequate new transfers to reduce poverty in the future.40 Our results show that even
without additional donor resources, debt relief, by encouraging selectivity, would at
least ensure more funds for countries with good policies and adequate institutions—and
of course fewer for countries with bad policies and inadequate institutions.41 And it can
create a virtuous circle by crowding in private flows to good policy/low debt countries.
Our analysis also suggests another immediate benefit from the planned debt reduction,
also without any increase in total donor resources. Debt reduction can help correct the
apparent current imbalance between discrete project funding and budget support.
Compared to the low-level chaos of multiple projects with multiple donor sponsors
under multiple procurement rules, this can bring greater efficiency to the development
assistance business by creating space for country ownership. However, donors can only
realize this benefit in settings where governments are accountable—and thus it relies on
prior selectivity.
In short, our results show the potential for debt reduction to alter donor and creditor
behaviour, creating a better ‘regime’ for the development assistance business to be
effective. Better donor behaviour would not only enhance development outcomes in
some countries in the short run, it would also set the stage for more effective
development assistance in the long run, as creditors would have reasonable recourse to
the use of assistance as a carrot for improved policies and institutions. That might, in
turn, make it politically possible to convince the public in donor countries that it makes
sense to raise development assistance budgets.
However, though necessary, debt reduction is far from sufficient to ensure donor
selectivity. Though it can allow a change in donor behaviour, it does not guarantee it.
                                                
40 Sachs et al. (1999).
41 The latter group could end up with reduced net transfers simply because the debt reduction will make
it easier for donors and creditors (and particularly the IMF) to reduce what our evidence suggests is
now forced lending.28
Our results also point to the risks of donors as well as recipient countries falling back
into the debt game of the past. They suggest the need, particularly following what may
become ‘non-selective’ debt relief itself (and in our framework, there is no real reason
why debt reduction should be selective, since it does not automatically lead to higher
transfers), for greatly increased emphasis on selectivity in future ‘grants’ making and
lending. At the same time, understanding of past behaviour of creditors suggests that it
would be difficult for creditors, without debt reduction, to make the necessary break
with past practice—and thus difficult to ever increase their contribution through
development assistance to the tremendous development challenges in Africa.29
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Appendix
Project and non-project activity-related flows
A World Bank report says there are 100,000 foreign advisors in Africa, and that they
consume US$ 4 billion of all international assistance—i.e. as much as a quarter of all
net transfers.42 This may have been more the case in the 1980s than in the last decade,
as donors have attempted to increase support for ‘programmes’ (e.g. to finance a portion
of the education budget), making their transfers much more akin to budget support. The
relevant ODA (overseas development assistance) data are difficult to interpret, but we
categorized extensive listings of donor-assisted activities into ‘projects’, non-projects’
and ‘debt relief’ for the two periods shown below, in an attempt to glean any evidence
of change in the degree to which recipient governments were receiving more flexible
budget support. Recognizing that even ‘project’ money may be fungible, we note that
there has been no discernible change in the proportion of non-projects, and that debt
relief increased only marginally in the 1990s compared to the 1980s.
Appendix Table 1
Project and non-project activity
1977-87 1988-98
Project, % 71.5 74.3
Non-Project, % 16.5 13.6
Creditors (debt relief), % 11.9 12.1
Total, % 100.0 100.0
Thus it appears that at least some external support comes in a form that is difficult to
spend efficiently, and may generate lower economic returns than would alternative uses
of the same amounts. In addition to efficiency losses there is the less measurable cost of
limited flexibility, i.e. that governments are likely to have difficulty planning and
sustaining even those public investments with high returns.43 In short, from the point of
view of recipient countries the multiplicity of donors financing separate projects (with
separate administrative, auditing and other demands) makes management of total
resources difficult and reduces local officials’ capacity to plan and manage programmes
and policy.
There has been considerable discussion of the question of ownership of reform
programmes financed by donors—with the lack of ownership of reforms said to explain
poor programme effectiveness and low growth.44 It is possible that the problem of
ownership is rooted, however, not only or solely in the lack of local agreement on
policy reforms, but also in the greatly reduced scope for planning and management of
public programmes and resources that the multiplicity of donors, and the weight of
donor financing in overall investment, has represented. At least in principle the problem
could be minimized with a shift of donor transfers to a more common pool,45 and the
                                                
42 World Bank (2000a).
43 The situation may also foster a climate of corruption as monitoring is difficult
44 For example, Collier (2000).
45 On this point, see Kanbur et al. (1999).32
deployment of that common pool in the form of much more fungible programme or
budget support. Use of a common pool remains unlikely because donors have their own
bureaucratic limits and because bilateral donors often need to respond to their own
legislatures’ priorities. Budget or programme support has been limited because donors
have not always been convinced about the capacity of recipient governments to utilize
general funds well, or they have feared abuse of general funds in settings where
corruption is a problem.